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to which (a) only sentences can be used to make assertions and (b) only sentences are meaningful in isolation. Dummett writes:
A sentence is, as we have said, the smallest unit of language with which a linguistic act can be accomplished, with which 'a move can be made in the language game'... (Dummett 1973, p. 194) .... assertion consists in the (deliberate) utterance of a sentence which, by its form and context, is recognized as being used according to a certain general convention .... (Dummett 1973 , p. 311, our emphasis) It is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. (Dummett 1981, p. 360) If the Claim is true, it would seem that not just sentences, but also words and phrases can be used in isolation; and not just sentences, but also words and phrases are meaningful in isolation.3
Of course everyone agrees that speakers appear to produce ordinary words and phrases in isolation. To account for the appearances, while denying the Claim, one must maintain something like the following:
The Ellipsis Hypothesis: Whenever a speaker makes an as sertion by uttering an (apparently) unembedded word or phrase, what that speaker really utters is an elliptical sentence.
The burden of this paper is to support the Claim by arguing against the ellipsis hypothesis. Before turning to that, however, let us explain the Claim in greater detail, by laying out what we mean by "phrase".
THE SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF PHRASES
We assume that the notion "word" is clear enough for our purposes. But what are phrases, syntactically speaking? X-bar theory, described in Jackendoff (1977), Chomsky (1981 Chomsky ( , 1982 Chomsky ( , 1986a , Haegeman (1991) and references cited there, provides a very general answer to this question.
According to X-bar theory, every formative has (at some level of represen tation) the following form -called the X-BAR SCHEMA:
3 For discussion of the primacy of sentences, see Davidson (1967) , Evans (1982, p. 67 ), Hacking (1975) and the literature on Frege's (1978) so-called "context principle". It is our view that ordinary words and phrases can be used in isolation to perform a wide range of speech acts. However, because of the philosophical centrality of assertion, we focus upon it. For extended discussion of the philosophical implications of the use of ordinary words and phrases to make assertions see Stainton (1993) . INFL dominates the inflectional morphology of the verb (i.e., subject verb agreement), tense markers and any infinitival markers (e.g., "to" in English). In English, INFL also dominates a closed class of words, con sisting of the aspectual auxiliaries ("have" and "be") and the modals ("will", "can", "may", "shall" and "must").
By substituting INFL for X in the X-bar schema we arrive at (4), the general form of sentences. (Elsewhere in the grammar it is stated that the specifier of I is NP, and that the complement of I is CP or VP.) The most important thing to notice about the foregoing is this: declar ative sentences -including elliptical sentences -express none of these three semantic types.6 Furthermore, whereas declarative sentences exhibit 4 Complementizer Phrases (CPs) are also projected from non-lexical heads, i.e., COMP. For our purposes, however, we can ignore this complication. 5 To be more precise, declarative sentences express propositional characters, in the sense of Kaplan (1977) : functions from contexts to propositions. See also Stalnaker (1978) . We abstract away from this complication throughout. 6 A note on empirical commitments: Obviously, X-bar theory and Montague-style semantics may turn out to be incorrect -particularly about details. It is reasonable to inquire, therefore, how much our conclusions rest upon the minutia of these theories. The details are not, we think, essential. For the sake of explicitness, it is important to adopt a single framework. And we do believe that Montague-style semantics, and X-bar syntax, are among the most promising, most specific and most accurate of those available. But, so far as we can see anyway, our conclusions do not stand or fall with the specifics of these particular theories. Nor do our arguments depend especially on the notation in which they are couched: a greatly illocutionary force (i.e., they are typically used to assert), it will become clear that ordinary words and phrases are not force bearing in this way. We should stress: we will be drawing a contrast between words and phrases (i.e., expression types) and declarative sentences (again: ex pression types). At issue is the content and force of the expressions them selves -not utterances of them. As we shall see, there is a sense in which declarative sentence types can truly be said to have assertoric forcebecause they have assertion as their recognized standard use. But the same cannot be truly said of word and phrase types. Word tokens and phrase tokens often exhibit assertoric force; but word types and phrase types do not.
This distinction (between propositional and non-propositional semantic types; force bearing and non-force bearing expressions) will serve as the basis for our semantic characterization of ordinary words and phrases:
semantically speaking, ordinary words and phrases are assigned to non propositional semantic types (including the three noted above) and they do not exhibit illocutionary force. Given this syntactic and semantic characterization of phrasehood we may now re-state the Claim: (1990) believes -the semantic ellipsis hypothesis must handle all assertoric uses of words and phrases. If the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis works for some but not all fragments, the semantical ellipsis hypothesis must cover those fragments not dealt with by the syntactic ellipsis hypo thesis. In the remaining sections of this paper we argue that the semantic ellipsis hypothesis is not up to either task.
THE SEMANTIC ELLIPSIS HYPOTHESIS
To flesh out the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, we offer an example.7 A typical speaker can make assertions by saying (9) on its own. Let us suppose Mary says it, thereby asserting that there is a fire nearby.
(9) fire
According to the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, this is not a case of uttering an ordinary word or phrase; rather, what gets produced in this case is a sentence, in the semantic sense. This sentence expresses a proposition (in particular, that there is a fire nearby) and has illocutionary force (in particular, assertoric force).
Here is a helpful mnemonic: on the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, when 7 Here and elsewhere we sometimes intentionally omit punctuation in the examples. To do otherwise might inadvertently influence one's take on the example, either for or against the semantic ellipsis hypothesis.
speakers (appear to) utter ordinary words and phrases, what they really produce are one-word or one-phrase sentences. The semantic type of these one-word and one-phrase sentences is, the story goes, propositional. But, according to the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, these expressions are not syntactically sentential: they are not headed by INFL. Furthermore, these one-word and one-phrase sentences have illocutionary force. (It is in this semantic sense that, the proponent of the semantic ellipsis hypo thesis says, they are "really" sentences, and not words and phrases at all.) So: on the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, the soundfire is actually ambigu ous. On the one hand, we are told, the sound fire corresponds to the ordinary word "fire". That word is a noun that occurs within sentences. The semantic type of this noun is an individual concept. Furthermore, the ordinary word "fire" -because it occurs within sentences -has no illocutionary force at all. On the other hand, goes the story, the sound fire also corresponds to the one-word sentence "fire" (maybe better: "Fire!"). The semantic type of this one-word sentence is propositional. What's more, the one-word sentence "fire" has assertoric force.
The semantic ellipsis hypothesis is importantly different from the syntac tic ellipsis hypothesis. According to the latter, but not the former, utter ances of (apparent) words and phrases inevitably have sentential Syntactic Structures. That is, only the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis is committed to the view that every assertoric utterance has a Syntactic Structure of the following form: "there" and the (unpronounced) verb of her sentence is "to be", in present singular.
A proponent of the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, on the other hand, will reply that the question has a false presupposition. The expression which Mary uttered, according to the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, contains no subject, no verb, and no inflectional element. Mary uttered the one-word sentence "fire". And, according to the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, though the one-word sentence "fire" is assigned a propositional character and assertoric force by the semantics of English, it is not a syntactic sentence.
(That is, its Syntactic Structure is not headed by INFL).
AGAINST THE SEMANTIC ELLIPSIS HYPOTHESIS

Illocutionary Force
In this section we will argue that when speakers (appear to) assertorically utter a simple word or phrase, the expressions they produce do not have illocutionary force. As illocutionary force is a property of semantic sen tences, this will establish that what speakers produce are not semantic sentences. Our argument will proceed as follows. First, we will consider several syntactic sentences (that is, maximal projections of an inflectional ele ment), which do have illocutionary force. This will give us an intuitive grasp of the property which these linguistic representations share. We will then inquire whether, according to our understanding, these so-called one word and one-phrase sentences exhibit this same property. Our conclusion will be that they do not. Hence they are not really semantic sentences at all. First, however, we repeat our word of caution: the issue will not be whether utterances of these so-called one-phrase sentences exhibit illocu tionary force. It is a platitude that whenever someone asserts, commands, or asks their utterance has illocutionary force. Since it is part of our claim that these expressions -whether they turn out to be ordinary words and phrases or semantically elliptical sentences -are commonly used to make assertions, we of course agree that utterances of them have illocutionary force; in particular, some have assertoric force. The question at hand concerns the expressions, not utterances of them. That is, to employ some standard vocabulary: we are inquiring about the properties had by certain linguistic types, not their tokens. Our conclusion shall be that these linguis tic types do not have illocutionary force. tence in the sense that the semantic type of the expression uttered is propositional.
We will now argue that even this restricted hypothesis is false. Since the original semantic ellipsis hypothesis entails the restricted semantic ellipsis hypothesis, the former is false if the latter is.
Ambiguity
In what follows we will argue that, on the restricted semantic ellipsis hypothesis, (so-called) one-word and one-phrase sentences are multiply ambiguous. Treating these expressions as multiply ambiguous is implaus ible on the face of it.
Consider the following contexts in which someone might say "red". First Situation: A doctor is testing her patient for colour blindness. She shows the patient paint samples, to see which ones he can distinguish.
Upon presenting him with a red paint sample, the patient produces the word "red", thereby asserting that the displayed paint sample is red.
Second Situation: Several friends are discussing their favourite thing about life. One says his favourite thing is Woody Allen movies; another says it is dancing; still another has an inclination toward ham salad sand wiches. The most poetic of the group produces the word "red". In so saying, he asserts that the colour red is his favourite thing about life.
Third Situation: An art dealer is looking over some new paintings by an abstract artist. The first ten have been painted entirely in shades of red. He looks at the next one, looks all around the room, and complains: "red". Here he might assert that all the paintings in the room are red.
Fourth Situation: An interior decorator is telling his client what colour he plans to paint the rooms of the client's house. He walks into the bathroom, and says "baby blue". He proceeds into the bedroom and mumbles "red". What he asserts thereby is that red is a colour he should use in the bedroom. We believe these four situations illustrate that, on the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, the purported semantically elliptical (i.e., one-word) sentence "red" must be multiply ambiguous. Let us stress that this is not simply a case of context dependence -like that exemplified by tense markers, pronouns, and the like. It is a real ambiguity: multiple meanings assigned not just to different utterances of "red", but to the expression "red". The four different propositions expressed in the four described situations cannot result simply from indexicality, because they have different propo sitional forms. And propositional form -i.e., the kind of proposition exhibited by an expression -is not the sort of thing that is context The proposition expressed by sentence (18d) -and by the word "red" in the fourth situation -does have argument-predicate form. But here RED is the argument, not the predicate. Its translation into the predicate calculus would have the form "Colour-I-should-use-for-the-bed room(Red)", where "Colour-I-should-use-for-the-bedroom" expresses a second order property.
As we said, the form of the proposition expressed by a sentence is not the sort of thing that varies according to context; a univocal expression cannot have more than one semantic type. Therefore, to account for these 10 A possible exception to this generalization, noted by one of the reviewers, would be sentences containing indexicals which refer to propositions. (We would add: such that the proposition referred to changes the propositional form of the whole. The latter condition excludes "That is what John believes" as a counter instance to our generalization since, we take it, this sentence always expresses a relation between John and some propositional object.) Whether or not there are such sentences, it is clear that the one-word sentence "red" -having no hidden structure -is not one of them. So the variation in propositional form exhibited by uses of "red" cannot result from indexical reference to a proposition.
four different uses of "red", the semantic ellipsis theorist must admit that the expression -the (so-called) one-word sentence "red" -is ambiguous, having at least the following meanings:
1. The one-word sentence "red" expresses the proposition that the (contextually specified) object O is red.
2.
The one-word sentence "red" expresses the proposition that the colour red has the (contextually specified) second order property P.
3.
The one-word sentence "red" expresses the proposition that the colour red is numerically identical to the (contextually spe cified) property P.
4.
The one-word sentence "red" expresses the proposition that the (contextually specified) generalized quantifier (Q, P) applies to the colour red. (For example, the quantifier (Every, painting) applies to red).
In short, on the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, the one-word sentence "red" will be at least four ways ambiguous. The same holds for one-word and one-phrase sentences generally. This postulation of meanings is implaus ible and ad hoc. We should, therefore, reject the semantic ellipsis hypo thesis. That the semantic ellipsis hypothesis requires its proponents to postulate many many extra expressions, and wholly unfamiliar compositional seman tic rules for them, is not a good thing. But it is not ultimately damning. Much more damaging is the fact that, so far as we can see, the introduction of semantically elliptical sentences does no explanatory work.
How Many Semantically Elliptical Sentences
Explanatory Power
The greatest problem facing the semantic ellipsis hypothesis is that no extra explanatory power is achieved by attributing knowledge of one-word and one-phrase sentences. We cannot give the detailed arguments here. That requires an entire paper: Stainton (1994) . But, here is a sketch.
Evidently, in order to use and construe syntactic sentences -that is, Inflectional Phrases -the speaker/hearer needs to know the meaning of ordinary words and phrases. After all, the meaning of whole sentences is built up from these smaller constituents. And, to use and construe syntac tic sentences, the speaker/hearer needs at least some pragmatic devices. So: we already know that these competences are present. However -and this is the crucial premise, argued for at length in Stainton (1994) -given only knowledge of the meaning of ordinary words and phrases, and a limited range of pragmatic devices (i.e., devices like those described in Sperber and Wilson (1986)), a speaker could make non-sentential as sertions; and, given only knowledge of the meaning of ordinary words and phrases, and a limited range of pragmatic devices, a hearer could interpret utterances of ordinary words and phrases as assertions. In a nutshell: already attested competences are alone sufficient for using and construing ordinary words and phrases in isolation. Hence there is no reason to introduce, as an extra competence, knowledge of one-word and one-phrase sentences.
Take one example. It is true enough that an individual whose idiolect contained the one-word sentence "red", assigned the propositional charac ter THE SALIENT OBJECT IS RED, would be able to construe the sound red as, e.g., an assertion that a displayed paint sample was red. But, it seems to us, another individual whose idiolect lacked the one-word sentence "red", but contained the ordinary word "red", would also be able to understand the sound in this way -essentially because the meaning of the ordinary word "red" could not be relevant. (Only propositions can be relevant, and the ordinary unembedded word "red" does not express a proposition.) Hence, to interpret the speaker, the hearer would auto matically search for a relevant proposition; one which the speaker could have meant. The proposition that the displayed paint sample is red is an obvious candidate.12
12
Here is another example; an "intuition pump" that may soften up some readers. Let us stipulate that the word "rojo", in Mark's version of Renglish, is not a one-word sentence. It is simply an ordinary adjective, which denotes the property shared by all red things. Let us further stipulate that Mark, who is just learning Renglish, has not yet learned any one word or one-phrase sentences. Mark is having eye trouble again, and goes in for a colour perception test. The Renglish doctor shows Mark the first paint sample, which Mark perceives as red. Mark recognizes the colour, and recalls that in Renglish this colour is called "rojo". But he cannot form the Renglish equivalent of "That is red". Maybe he forgets how. Nor, we are supposing, does he know any one-word or one-phrase sentence of Renglish which means the same as "That is red". Suppose Mark simply says the word "rojo", hoping that the doctor will understand that the sample appears red to him. Is this scenario not possible? Our intuition is that it is. Of course one wants to know exactly what goes on in the interpretive process. For instance: how would the doctor figure out Mark's communicate intentions? This Given this, should we say that typical English speakers know both the ordinary word "red" and the one-word sentence "red"? Not unless this gains us sufficient explanatory power. Which, we maintain, it does not. We can explain the use of the sound red in isolation without introducing the one-word sentence. So we should not introduce it. Of course the same holds for purported one-word and one-phrase sentences generally: each requires positing extra knowledge without any corresponding extra explan atory power; which violates Occam's Razor.
CONCLUSION
The restricted semantic ellipsis hypothesis, we have argued, is committed to an enormous number of multiply ambiguous expressions, the introduc tion of which gains us no extra explanatory power. We should, therefore, reject it. We should also spurn the original version since: (a) it entails the restricted version and (b) it incorrectly declares that, whenever a speaker makes an assertion by uttering an unembedded word or phrase, the ex pression uttered has illocutionary force. Once rejected, the semantic ellipsis hypothesis cannot account for the many exceptions to the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis. So, we can safely infer that the Claim is true.
(1) The Claim: Speakers can make assertions by uttering ordinary, unembedded, words and phrases.
To the degree that the Claim really is in tension with the primacy of sentences (i.e., the view that (a) only sentences can be used to make assertions and (b) only sentences are meaningful in isolation) this doctrine must also be rejected.
